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A COMPREHENSIVE gun control strategy designed to reduce the incidence of gun-related crime would need to address the successive decision points leading to the use of a gun in crime: the decision to acquire a gun, the decision to carry it, and the decision to use it for criminal purposes. Existing gun control efforts have typically focused on one of these decision points at the exclusion of the other two.l
The approach that casts the broadest net is the one that attempts to restrict the acquisition of guns. This includes laws that regulate or limit the importation, manufacture, sale, transfer, ownership, and/or possession of firearms. Such laws will, in principle, reduce the pool of potential gun offenders; fewer people will be in a position to carry a gun or to use it for criminal purposes.
Opponents of acquisition control laws argue that, in practice, such laws will not stop serious criminalspresumed to be responsible for most gun crime-from acquiring, carrying, and using guns. Instead, they say, such laws will deprive law-abiding citizens of the guns they want and need for sport and self-protection. A testimony to the perceived need for guns is the estimated 85 to 125 million firearms in the hands of the American public-easily one gun for every two adult citizens and more than one for each household. 1. The recent New York state gun law that became effective in 1980 is an exception that focuses on both carrying and use of a firearm.
James Wright, "The Recent Weapons
At the other end of the spectrum are approaches aimed narrowly at the decision to use a gun for criminal purposes. Gun-use laws, commonly referred to as "weapon enhancement" statutes, typically impose an additional term of imprisonment for crimes committed with a gun. Michigan's "felony firearms statute" which adds a mandatory two years to the sentence imposed for offenses such as aggravated assault, armed robbery, forcible rape, and criminal homicide when they are committed with a gun is an example of this approach. 3 A law of this kind is more attractive politically; it specifically targets the "criminal element," those who have been convicted of violent felony offenses. Consequently, organized gun interests have not strenuously opposed such statutes in states like California, Florida, and Michigan. But the effects of these weapons enhancement laws are doubtful. The most thoroughly studied of these statutes-the Michigan felony firearms law-shows no solid evidence of having reduced gun-related crime. 4 The problem with this approach may be that it targets too narrow a group of potential offenders who are too committed to criminal activity and too dependent on guns in such activity.
Perhaps the optimal approach from the standpoint of both deterrent effectiveness and political feasibility is the one that targets the decision to carry a gun outside of the home or place of business. It may be that a substantial proportion of those who become involved in gun-related crimes carry guns but do not anticipate the specific situations that will precipitate their use and do not have the time or presence of mind when confronted with these situations to weigh the punishment if caught against the immediate advantage of using a gun. The Massachusetts legislature took this approach when it enacted the Bartley-Fox gun law, which mandated a one-year minimum prison term for the unlicensed carrying of firearms. The law was explicitly intended to reduce the incidence of gun-related crime as well as the illicit carrying of firearms. Thus when David Bartley, one of the law's framers, first submitted the bill to the Massachusetts House of Representatives, he stated that the purpose of the law was to halt "all unlicensed carrying of guns . . . and to end the temptation to use the gun when it should not even be available."
The law is unlikely to be effective against those who decide to carry a gun for a specific, short-term purpose, such as robbing a bank. The target group is rather those who carry guns on their persons or in their cars without specific criminal purpose in mind, but as a matter of life-style-those Beha has called the "casual carriers."5 The cumulative risk of apprehension for such people may be substantial over an extended period of time, especially if police employ proactive search-and-seizure tactics.
The law confronted this group with a dramatic apparent increase in the legal risk associated with carrying a gun without a license. A concerted campaign for two months prior to the law's effective date characterized the impending consequences in the following terms, "If you are caught with a gun, you will go to prison for a year and nobody can get you out." Carrying without a license had previously been punished with a fine or suspended sentence, and only occasionally with a brief incarceration.
For its intended impact on gunrelated crime, this kind of law may be said to rely upon a derivative deterrent effect. That is, by increasing the punishment imposed for one offense-carrying a gun without a license-the law is intended to reduce the incidence of other crimes: gun assaults, gun robberies, and gun homicides.
The Massachusetts gun law could, conceivably, have still further deterrent effects on gun assault, gun robbery, and gun homicide if offenders were charged for carrying without a license and had a year added to the sentence imposed for assault, robbery, or homicide.6 Such 6. Since the punishments imposed for aggravated assaults, armed robbery, and criminal homicide are, respectively, more severe in that order (quite apart from the use of a gun), a flat or constant increment in punishment when a gun is used may be expected to reduce gun assaults most, gun robberies next, and gun homicides least. The proportional addition to (marginal utility of) the additional punishment corresponds to this ordering of the three crimes. The fact that homicides are largely assault and robbery precipitated adds a derivative deterrent component for gun homicides. And, the fact that punishments for the nongun versions of assault, robbery, and homicide remain unaltered, adds a weapons displacement component for all three crimes, an application of the law follows the model of a weapons enhancement statute. The available evidence suggests, however, that the approach will have little or no impact on gunrelated crime.7 Moreover, the publicity surrounding the implementation of the law gave no indication that it would be applied in this way, nor has this approach been adopted in subsequent practice to any noticeable degree.8
The To the extent that armed assault is situationally provoked rather than purposeful and preplanned, the removal of guns from the situations in which assault occurs cannot be expected to reduce the overall number of assaults. In assault-provoking situations, those involved will presumably resort to whatever weapons are available at the scene. Hence a reduction in the public's propensity to go armed with guns may increase the number of nongun assaults. Indeed, with fewer guns being carried into assault-prone situations, potential assaulters may feel less restrained, and hence the increase in nongun assaults could more than offset the decrease in gun assaults. the predicted future of the crime time series based on its history prior to the policy intervention.
A major advantage of this method is that the techniques are capable of incorporating the type of seasonal cycles that is often found in crime data. This is particularly important because seasonal fluctuations can obscure or be mistaken for immediate or short-term effects of a policy intervention. When regular seasonal cycles are observed in the data, as has been the case with monthly assault statistics in Massachusetts, the information from Deutsch's ESTIM program is used to deseasonalize the data. After this step, the future of the time series is predicted in terms of its trend and ARIMA components.
For gun assault, we found that a statistically significant downward shift occurred in March 1975-the month prior to implementation of Bartley-Fox.13 Since implementation was preceded by a vigorous publicity campaign of several months duration, it is not surprising to find evidence that the law began to influence behavior even before it was officially in effect. Our analysis found that the downward shift that oc-13. This is not at all a necessarily surprising result. The Bartley-Fox law was preceded by a dramatic, and not completely accurate, two-month publicity campaign, designed to educate the public concerning the new consequences citizens faced for violating the Massachusetts gun law. Under these circumstances, it is quite possible that this publicity preceding the gun law's introduction on 1 April 1975 resulted in what Zimring has termed an "announcement" effect by creating in the minds of citizens and potential gun offenders the impression that the new law was actually in force prior to its effective date. If this were so, we might indeed expect the gun law, or more accurately its publicity, to have affected gun and nongun related assaults as early as February 1975. curred in March was sustained in subsequent months.
The same type of analysis yielded a statistically significant increase in nongun armed assaults in Boston, beginning in May 1975. We interpret this result as reflecting a tendency for people to substitute other weapons for guns in assault situations following implementation of the law.
A similar set of analysis for the remainder of Massachusetts demonstrated similar, though less pronounced, effects.'4
Control group comparisons
As noted, intervention point analysis, by incorporating information on the pre-Bartley-Fox history of gun and nongun armed assaults, controlled for the effect of ongoing trends that might otherwise obscure or be mistaken for an impact of the law, or its publicity. These methods, however, do not control for those instances where exogenous events or socioeconomic factors intervene and result in departures from prior trends in crime. The Bartley-Fox law, of course, represents one such event, but the issue is to isolate the effects of the law from the effects of other possible factors.
To address this issue, we introduce control groups into our analysis. Table 1 suggest the rather surprising conclusion that the weapon substitution effect of Bartley-Fox was larger than the deterrent effect-that is, the increase in nongun assaults more than compensated for the reduction in gun assaults. However, closer scrutiny of these data have convinced us that deterrent effects of the law are underestimated in Boston. Implementation of the Bartley-Fox law and its attendant publicity appears to have increased the likelihood of citizens' reporting gun assaults. We present the evidence for this conclusion in the next section.
The statistics in

Impact on citizen reporting: more refined measurement of gun assaults
As Richard Block has noted, the citizen's decision to notify the police of a crime is based, in part, on a victim's "calculation of the benefits derived from notification and the costs incurred."21 For example, a victim may think he has something to gain by reporting an assault if he believes that the police can actually catch and punish an offender.
The Bartley-Fox law may have altered the likelihood that citizens will report gun crimes, particularly gun assaults, to the police. Compared with robberies or murders, assaults are a relatively ambiguous category of offenses. That is, in some cases it may not be altogether clear to the average citizen whether a legally punishable assault has actually occurred. Particularly in cases where a victim has been threatened with the visible display of a deadly weapon, but where no injury has occurred, the citizen may not be sure that such an action constitutes a criminal assault that the police and courts will take seriously. The Bartley-Fox law may have signaled the public that any crime involving a gun was serious and would be treated as such by the criminal justice system. We would expect that any tendency of the law to increase citizens' reporting of gun assaults would be concentrated on the less serious forms of gun assault that involved threats rather than injuries. Empirical research bears out this observation. Richard Block found that assault victims who have been hospitalized or have received medical attention are significantly more likely to report the crime to the police than victims who were not injured.22 Thus more accurate estimates of the deterrent effect of the gun law on assaultive behavior-unbiased by possible changes in citizens' reporting behaviors-could be obtained by isolating for analysis those gun assaults where an injury has been incurred. This line of analysis cannot, however, be pursued using the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) statistics because the UCR definition of an armed assault combines into one category: (1) assaults that involve only threats or attempts to inflict "bodily harm" on a victim and (2) assaults in which the victim actually has been injured. With statistics based on the UCR definition of assault, then, it is not possible to separate gun assaults that are threats from those that result in injury.
Fortunately, the Boston Police Department's (BPD) computerized crime statistics provide more refined categories of gun assaults than 22. Block. Table 2 presents the annual number of gun assaults with battery in Boston from 1974 through 1976. This is the category that research suggests should be less subject to changes in reporting behavior. Notably, while UCR Boston gun assault statistics (Table 1) show only a 11.7 percent decline between 1974 and 1976, BPD gun assaults with battery-that is, those most likely to involve injury-show a 37.1 percent decline over this same period. Thus the subcategory of gun assaults with battery showed a decrease in the two years following the introduction of the Bartley-Fox law more than three times the decrease exhibited by the UCR gun assault statistics, which groups gun assaults both with and without battery into one category.
Note further that in the two years after the introduction of the law, the number of gun assaults without battery actually increased and that the increase was concentrated between 1975 and 1976. Thus it would appear that the pattern of reported gun assaults in Table 1, especially the  increase between 1975 and 1976 in Boston, occurs in the category of assaults without battery, which is more subject to reporting biases. Although the specific dynamic underlying the increase in incidence of less serious forms of gun assault in Boston is unclear, it seems likely that the increase is a result of some change in citizens' willingness to report gun assaults.
If we rely on Boston's battery gun assault statistics for our estimate of the deterrent impact of the gun law in Boston, we find, as noted previously, that Boston showed a 37.1 percent decline in the level of gun assaults between 1974 and 1976. It is important to note that using this revised estimate of the gun law's impact, we find that Boston's twoyear decline in gun assaults is 30 percent greater than exhibited by any of Boston's control jurisdictions in Table 1 .
Conclusions of the assault analysis
The introduction of the BartleyFox gun law had a twofold effect on armed assaults in Massachusetts. First, the law substantially reduced the incidence of gun assaults in Boston and other Massachusetts communities. Importantly, the decline in gun assaults in Boston appears to have started one month prior to the introduction of the law-suggesting that offenders initially were responding to the publicity attendant with the gun law implementation. Second, the gun law also apparently resulted in a substantial increase in nongun armed assaults. Thus while the law appears to have deterred some individuals from carrying and/or using their firearm, it appears not to have encouraged these individuals to avoid assaultive situations.
The law also appears to have increased the likelihood of citizens reporting less serious forms of gun assaults to the police; at least in Boston this phenomenon tended to obscure the deterrent effect of the law on gun assaults.
ARMED ROBBERY
As with our analysis of the Bartley-Fox law's impact on armed assaults, the armed robbery analysis will examine the dual questions of deterrence and weapon substitution. Specifically, we shall examine whether the gun law resulted in a reduction in gun robberies and whether this change was offset by corresponding increases in robberies with other types of weapons.
The analysis will also compare the relative magnitude of potential deterrence and weapon substitution effects for robbery with those observed in the assault analysis. To the extent that robbery is more often the result of planned purposeful action than is assault, we would expect a law like Bartley-Fox to have less deterrent impact on robbery because this law is specifically aimed at the carrying rather than the using of a firearm. Under these circumstances, individuals who carry firearms with a specific use in mind have relatively less to lose than offenders who are not planning to assault or to rob someone. Quite simply, although the costs are the same in terms of the gun law-a one-year prison term-the benefits of carrying a gun are less for the person who carries a gun, but who has no specific anticipated use for it.
Compared with assault, we also expect the magnitude of the displacement effects to be less. The logic behind this hypothesis is straightforward.23 Robbery with a gun is generally a much easier task than robbery with other types of deadly weapons, unless an offender chooses to rob highly vulnerable targets. However, there is also a disincentive to switch to more vulnerable targets because these also tend to be much less lucrative, for example, a street robbery of an elderly person is generally much easier but also less lucrative than a robbery of a drug store.
Control group comparisons
Data restrictions prevent our conducting an intervention point analy- The available data are sufficient, however, for a comparison group analysis. As in the assault analysis, we examined the law's impact on (1) gun robbery, (2) nongun armed robbery, and (3) the percent that gun robbery represents of all armed robbery for Boston. Table 3 Indeed, analysis of Boston's nongun robbery statistics (Table 3) One measure-the fraction of robberies involving guns-incorporates both the potential deterrent and displacement effects of the law, and hence is an especially sensitive 
Conclusions on armed robbery
The introduction of the BartleyFox law appears to have resulted in a short-term reduction in gun robberies throughout the city of Boston, Massachusetts. The decrease in gun robberies also appears to have been accompanied by an increase in nongun armed robberies. The magnitude of the displacement effect for armed robbery appears to be less than we observed for armed assault.
Finally, due to data contingencies and time limitations, our conclusions with regard to robbery are more tentative than they are for assault: (1) historical data on gun robbery is unavailable prior to 1974 and (2) a refined analysis of the impact of the Bartley-Fox law on the reporting of gun robbery using BPD data has not yet been conducted.
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE
To the extent that homicide is a function of an offender's premediated willful intention to kill his victim, we would have little reason to expect that the Bartley-Fox law would deter gun-related homicides. The assumption is that an offender who is willing to risk the legal sanction for murder would also be willing to risk the sanction for a BartleyFox offense. On the other hand, if as Richard Block proposes, homicides occur not primarily as a result of an offender's planned determination to kill, but rather as something that sometimes happens as the unanticipated consequence of other criminal or life-style activities,25 then the introduction of the gun law might have a derivative deterrent effect on gun homicide. That is, the gun law might prevent some gun-related homicides by affecting the decisions that potential offenders make regarding whether or not to carry a firearm, and/or whether or not to use a firearm to commit a robbery or an assault.
Indeed, we have already observed that the Bartley-Fox law appeared to reduce gun-related assaults and robberies throughout Massachusetts. Thus we should not be surprised if gun-related homicides also show a decline following the Bartley-Fox law.
There also appears to have been an increase after the law in nongun armed assaults and, to a lesser extent, nongun armed robberies. However, for at least two reasons, we also do not expect to find similar displacement effects for criminal homicides: (1) we would expect to find that an increase in nongun armed assaults or robberies did not result in a proportionate increase in nongun criminal homicides because guns are likely to be more deadly than other types of weapons and (2) offenders who switch from 
Comparison group analysis
As in the robbery and assault analyses, we will compare homicide trends for Boston with those in selected control jurisdictions. We have selected as our control jurisdictions grouped into communities of 250,000 to 1,000,000 inhabitants for the Middle Atlantic states, the North Central states, and all United States cities, except Boston. In addition, we also included the selected Eastern Seaboard and North Central cities included in the assault and robbery analyses.
Criminal homicide statistics for Boston and the control jurisdictions are presented in Table 4 . We first examine the impact of the BartleyFox law on gun-related homicide. In the first year-1974 to 1975-following the gun law's implementation, gun homicide in Boston declined by 21.4 percent-a decrease greater than any of the jurisdictions experienced except Baltimore. In the two years-1974 to 1976-after Bartley-Fox, gun homicides in Boston declined by 55.7 percent-a decrease greater than that exhibited by any of the control jurisdictions. Thus it appears that the Bartley-Fox law in the short-term prevented some gun-related homicides in Boston.
We, of course, want to address the issue as to whether the BartleyFox law also produced displacement effects similar to those observed for nongun armed assaults and to a lesser extent nongun armed robberies. However, when nongun criminal homicides for Boston are examined we find that in the two years-1974 to 1976-following Bartley-Fox, nongun homicides actually dropped in Boston by 20.3 percent. Moreover, only one of the control jurisdictions-Washington, D.C.-exceeded this decline while several other jurisdictions experienced decreases in nongun criminal homicide ranging between 1.5 percent and 13.5 percent. Thus we find no evidence suggesting a displacement effect of the Bartley-Fox law on nongun criminal homicide.
The pattern of impact where gun homicides appear to have been deterred while nongun homicides do not appear to have increased has important implications because it suggests that the Bartley-Fox law may have had an overall effect of reducing incidence of criminal homicides in Boston, at least in the short run. Indeed, if the gun homicide and nongun homicide statistics in Table 4 are added together, we can see that the overall level of criminal homicides showed a greater decline in Boston-38.8 percentthan in any of the control jurisdictions in the two years following the introduction of the gun law.
Finally, further evidence of the Bartley-Fox law's impact on criminal homicide in Boston is available when the percent of gun homicides (Table 4) is studied. Here we find that between 1974 and 1976, Boston showed a greater decrease in this measure than any of the control jurisdictions.
Criminal homicide conclusion
The Bartley-Fox law appears to have in the short run deterred some gun-related criminal homicides in Boston, but the law does not appear
